|230333 :||Microeconomics 3 (CentER)|
||lectures + tutorials
||Written final exam (80%) and regular graded homework assignments (20%).
|Studielast:||6 ECTS credits
|Blackboard informatie||Link to
Blackboard (Als u de melding 'Guest are not allowed in this course' krijgt, dient u nog bij Blackboard in te loggen)
The goal of the course is to make the students familiar with the economics of uncertainty and incomplete information and the basics of welfare economics and mechanism design. Equilibrium concepts from game theory are needed to obtain efficient outcomes in case information to the agents about their preferences or performance is uncertain or incomplete. Welfare economics is about the aggregation of individual preferences to a social welfare function and it is learned what is possible here. In case of incomplete information mechanisms are designed to implement social outcomes.
Doel van de cursus (alleen in het Engels beschikbaar)
In the presence of asymmetric information market equilibria often fail to be Pareto optimal. Adverse selection arises when an informed individual's decisions depend on his privately held information that adversely affects uninformed market participants. Informed individuals may find ways to signal information about their unobservable knowledge through observable actions or uniformed parties may screen informed individuals. In case an individual hires another to take some action for him as his agent informational problems arise in this principal-agent setting from hidden actions (moral hazard) and hidden information.
Inhoud van de cursus (alleen in het Engels beschikbaar)
In case of complete information the fundamental theorems of welfare economics are treated which state that a competitive general equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal and a social welfare optimum and that the reverse holds under convexity conditions. It is also in the core of the economy. The result still holds under uncertainty if the asset markets have enough structure.
In welfare economics the aggregation of the arbitrary preferences of agents often leads to impossibility results. When the domain is restricted interesting results can be obtained. In case of uncertainty about preferences mechanisms like auctions are designed to let the agents have an incentive to truthfully reveal in equilibrium their preferences.
Before enrolling all non-CentER students should ask permission to the Director of Graduate Studies in Economics. Please send your request for permission to CentER Graduate School at email@example.com.
Bijzonderheden (alleen in het Engels beschikbaar)
- A. Mas-Colell, M.D. Whinston, and J.R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995, ISBN 978-0-1950-7340-9.
Quantitative Methods (CentER), Microeconomics 1 (CentER) and Microeconomics 2 (CentER)